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Private Damage Claims and the Passing-On Defense in Horizontal 
Price-Fixing Cases: An Economist’s Perspective
1 
1.  Introduction and Overview 
The European Court of Justice’s Courage decision and the European Commission’s Green Paper 
have put the matter of private claims for damages from antitrust violations on the agenda of 
European competition policy. The Court stresses the effet utile of allowing private parties to 
claim damages in antitrust cases. The Commission sees the prospect of private damage awards as 
an incentive device to strengthen the private enforcement of antitrust law. It hopes that enhanced 
private enforcement will provide some compensation for the loss of information and control that 
might be caused by the abandonment of the notification system that was in place before Regula-
tion 1/2003.  
This development contrasts with past practice, which has been fairly hostile to private damage 
claims in antitrust matters. It raises fundamental legal issues, as well as issues of appropriate an-
titrust policy.  
A key issue concerns the relation of the concept of “damages” in antitrust cases to the concept of 
“damages” in general tort law. This issue is closely linked to the question of the relation between 
European antitrust law and national tort law. Given the strength that the law derives from the 
doctrinal unity of civil law, a differentiation between the notions of damages in antitrust cases 
and in other torts cases seems undesirable. However, tort law, like civil law in general, is a na-
tional prerogative. Doctrinal unity in the notion of damages in antitrust cases and in other torts 
cases in any one jurisdiction may therefore be at odds with the European character of antitrust 
law and antitrust law enforcement.
2 
Under any law, the assessment of damages raises two fundamental questions:  
  Who is to have standing to submit claims for damages in antitrust cases? 
  What is the proper measure of damages? 
In antitrust law, these questions are intimately linked. Consider the assessment of damages 
against producers who have formed an illegal cartel and suppose that the customers of the cartel 
members are themselves firms that use the good in question as an input into their own produc-
tion. The cartel’s price-fixing has raised costs for the purchasers. However, it is quite likely that 
they have been able to pass some of the cost increase on to their own customers by raising their 
                                        
1   Paper presented at the Conference on Private Enforcement in Antitrust, Max Planck Institute for Compara-
tive and International Private Law, Hamburg, April 6 – 7, 2006. For comments on a preliminary version of 
this paper, I thank Jürgen Basedow, Stefan Bechtold, Felix Bierbrauer, Christoph Engel, and Frank Maier-
Rigaud. I am also grateful for research support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15. 
Some of the research for this paper had originally been done in preparation for the German Monopolies 
Commission’s Special Report on the Reform of the Law Against Restraint of Competition, see Mo-
nopolkommission, Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle – Die Pressefusionskon-
trolle in der Siebten GWB-Novelle, Sondergutachten 41/42, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2004.  
2   … unless one were to think of a Europeanization of torts in antitrust cases as being the first step towards a 
Europeanization of civil law altogether! Early on in the discussion about modernization,  the German Mo-
nopolies Commission pointed to the basic conflict between the national character of tort law and the Euro-
pean character of antitrust as a source of frictions for antitrust enforcement by the national courts. See Mo-
nopolkommission , Folgeprobleme der europäischen Kartellrechtsreform, Sondergutachten 32, Nomos Ver-
lag, Baden-Baden 2002, pp. 50 ff.    2
own prices. The downstream customers are thus indirectly hurt by the cartel’s price-fixing. Does 
this give them standing to claim damages from the cartel members? Moreover, are the direct 
purchasers’ own price increases relevant for the assessment of damages that they can claim 
against the cartel members?  
The Supreme Court of the United States has answered both these questions in the negative. In 
Hanover Shoe,
3 it rejected what is known as the passing-on defense, according to which any 
benefits that the intermediary firm has obtained by raising his own prices must be deducted from 
the damages that can be claimed against the upstream supplier. In Illinois Brick,
4 it denied stand-
ing to indirect purchasers. The Court’s judgment in Hanover Shoe was based on the considera-
tion that indirect purchasers tend to be widely dispersed, somewhat removed from the original 
offense, and therefore too weak to be mounting much of a claim for damages in their own right. 
Therefore, antitrust offenders might get off too lightly if the passing-on defense was allowed to 
reduce the direct purchasers’ claims. Given this rejection of the passing-on defense, Illinois Brick 
was based on the consideration that, if the “passing-on theory” was rejected as an argument 
when given by antitrust offenders, it also had to be rejected as an argument when given by indi-
rect purchasers.
5  
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the passing-on defense is based on incentive considerations. 
The Court considers that, if antitrust offenders get off too lightly, the prospect of liability for pri-
vate damages may not provide enough of an incentive to refrain from illegal price-fixing. From 
the perspective of general tort law, at least in Germany, one may ask whether such incentive 
considerations are compatible with the principle that payments for damages should provide for 
equitable restitution, i.e. the restoration of positions that the victims would have had in the ab-
sence of the offence, and that payments for damages should not provide for the enrichment of 
victims. Adherents of the passing-on defense argue that this principle is violated if the direct 
purchaser is allowed to claim the amount by which he was overcharged without any deductions 
for the extra revenues that he got from his own customers by raising the prices that he was charg-
ing them. The passing-on defense is presented as an application of the general principle that 
damages are to be assessed net of any benefits that the victim of the violation has obtained in the 
event. 
In the following, I will consider the merits of these different positions. Relying on my compara-
tive advantage as an economist, I will focus on what actually happens when the producers of a 
commodity get together to engage in illegal price-fixing. The results of the analysis are some-
what surprising because they suggest that the positions of both the United States Supreme Court 
and the proponents of the passing-on defense are flawed. Both have paid too little attention to (i) 
the fact that damages comprise foregone profits, as well as actual losses,
6 and (ii) the question of 
                                        
3   Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
4   Illinois Brick Co. et al. v. Illinois et al. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
5   This denial of standing to indirect purchasers has met with significant criticism and, indeed, at the State 
level, a small majority of States have chosen to allow indirect purchaser suits, thus making use of an option 
that the Supreme Court provided in California v. ARC America Corp. 490 US 93 (1989). For an overview 
and assessment, see Roger D. Blair and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Mod-
ern Antitrust Standing Analysis, George Washington Law Review 68 (1999), pp. 1 – 43, Friedrich W. Bulst, 
Schadensersatzansprüche der Marktgegenseite im Kartellrecht, Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht 45, Nomos 
Verlag und Verlag C.H. Beck, Baden-Baden 2006, Marten P. Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra, and Jakob Rüggeberg, 
Illinois Walls: How Barring Indirect Purchaser Suits Facillitates Collusion, Universiteit van Amsterdam 
Discussion paper, July 2006.  
6   This is also criticized by Schinkel et al. (supra fn. 5), p. 6, fn. 13.   3
what is the proper notion of causation to be used in assessing what damages can be ascribed to 
the cartel. Once these matters are fully considered, one sees that (i) a rejection of the passing-on 
defense can be fully compatible with the notion of damages as a device for equitable restitution 
and (ii) there need not be any firm link between the treatments of passing-on effects for direct 
purchasers and for indirect purchasers. 
Actual losses can be identified with the overcharge on the amount that is actually purchased from 
the cartel members. In addition to these actual losses, there are foregone profits when  the cartel 
members’ overcharging induces the direct buyer to reduce his purchases, thus forego some bene-
fits that he would otherwise have obtained. One reason for this may be that the direct buyer’s 
attempt to pass the cartel price on to his own customers lowers the latter’s demand for the direct 
buyer’s product and therefore the direct buyer’s need for the input that he buys from the cartel 
members. A complete account of passing-on effects would have to take account of this business 
loss, as well as the increased per-unit revenue on the business that is retained. Once this is done, 
one finds that the business-loss effect may actually outweigh the per-unit revenue enhancing ef-
fect, on which the passing-on defense relies. In particular, the paper will show that the business-
loss effect always outweighs the per-unit revenue enhancing effect if the direct buyers from the 
cartel members are not in competition with each other, i.e., if each direct buyer is a monopolist in 
his own market downstream. In this case, the overcharge on the actual quantity that a direct 
buyer purchases from the cartel member is a lower bound to the overall damages that he suffers. 
Any use of the passing-on defense to reduce damage claims below the overcharge on actual pur-
chases would be based on fallacious reasoning. I will show that an appropriate assessment of 
damages for the direct buyer, taking account of both the business-loss effect and the per-unit 
revenue enhancing  effect actually requires the same procedure as the assessment of damages 
when the direct buyer is a final consumer; passing-on effects suffered by indirect buyers come on 
top of the damages suffered by the direct buyer. 
Matters are more complicated if the direct buyers from the cartel members are in competition 
with each other. In this case, the cartel members’ price-fixing affects the pattern of competition 
between the direct buyers. The overcharge raises the input prices of all direct purchasers at the 
same time and induces all of them to raise their output prices. The business-loss effects from the 
output-price increase of any one direct buyer are smaller than they would if this direct buyer was 
the only one to be raising his price. The reason is that the downstream customer who faces a 
price increase from his supplier may find that the other suppliers have raised their prices as well, 
and, therefore, there is no point in changing suppliers. Alternatively, one can say that the busi-
ness-loss effect that a direct buyer experiences when he raises his own price is counteracted by a 
business-gain effect that is due to the other direct buyers also raising their prices. The increase in 
the costs that the direct buyer’s rivals are bearing benefits the direct buyer and enhances the 
harm suffered by the direct buyer’s customers downstream. 
At this point, however, one must be careful about the notion of causation that one is using, i.e., 
about the standard of comparison used in assessing the damages. Three issues arise. First, the 
illegal price-fixing of upstream producers involves not one action, but many. There is, first of all, 
the illegal agreement itself. There is, second, the sale of the good at excessive prices by some 
cartel member to direct buyer A, in combination with the refusal of all cartel members to sell the 
good to A at a lower price. There is, third, the sale of the good at excessive prices by some cartel 
member to direct buyer B, in combination with the refusal of all cartel members to sell the good 
to B at a lower price. Which of these actions are deemed to constitute the offense against A for   4
which damages are being assessed? Should we consider all of them together? Or should we con-
sider only those actions that concern A directly, leaving out those actions that concern B?  
If A and B are competing in a downstream market, the distinction between these two notions of 
what constitutes the offense against A is important because anything the cartel members are do-
ing to hurt B is likely to help A. The analysis below will actually show that, if a passing-on de-
fense is to make reduce damages below the overcharge on the amount actually purchased, it must 
be because the cartel members’ actions against B – and B’s response to these actions – are 
treated as part of the offense against A for which damages are being assessed. If the business-
loss effect is not matching or outweighing the per-unit revenue effect for A, it is because the car-
tel members’ actions against B relieve the pressures of competition from B to which A is sub-
jected. Under any concept of causation that takes B’s price as given and considers only the cartel 
members’ actions against A, the per-unit revenue effect of A increasing his own price would be 
outweighed by the business-loss effect, and the overcharge on the amount actually purchased 
would be a lower bound to the true value of damages. 
This brings me to a second issue, which concerns the actions of the other direct buyers. If we 
were to accept the notion that the offense against A for which damages are being assessed com-
prises the cartel members’ actions against B, as well as their actions against A, should B’s reac-
tion to the cartel members’ overcharging be treated as a part of this package? The benefits that A 
draws from the cartel members’ overcharging B are actually due to this reaction of B. If B did 
not raise his price in response to the cartel members’ overcharging him, the competitive pressure 
that he exerts on A would actually be unchanged, and the passing-on defense would have to be 
treated as before, with a business-loss effect outweighing the per-unit revenue effect. For the 
passing-on defense to be treated differently, one needs to consider both, the cartel members’ 
overcharging B and B’s reaction to this overcharging, as being part of the offense against A and 
providing a countervailing benefit that has to be taken into account in awarding damages.
7  
At this point, the difficulty arises that B is not just reacting to the cartel members’ overcharging 
him. He is also reacting to A’s raising his own output price. More precisely, A and B are both 
raising their output prices because the price-fixing upstream has changed the strategic game be-
tween them. How should we deal with the implications of strategic interdependence for the direct 
purchasers’ reactions to the illegal price-fixing upstream? Should we consider the entire move-
ment in the direct purchasers’ downstream prices to be induced by the cartel members’ actions? 
If not, where do we draw the line?  
If we do consider the entire movement in the direct purchasers’ downstream prices to be induced 
by the cartel members’ actions, we may end up reducing the direct purchasers’ claims to naught. 
There are, indeed, cases where the price-fixing upstream relaxes competition among direct pur-
chasers to such an extent that they are better off than they would be without the cartel; the bene-
fits of relaxed competition more than compensate for the increases in input costs.  
A third issue concerns the relation between the concept of causation that is used in assessing di-
rect purchasers’ claims and the concept of causation that is used in assessing indirect purchasers’ 
claims. If we consider the entire movement in the direct purchasers’ downstream prices to be 
induced by the cartel members’ actions, consistency would seem to require that we do so in cases 
involving indirect purchasers, as well as in cases involving direct purchasers. By this logic, the 
indirect purchaser would not have to identify which part of the price increase of A, from whom 
                                        
7   Strictly speaking, the benefits that A obtains from B’s raising his price is not due to a passing-on effect, but 
to a business-gain effect that would arise even if A did not change his own price.    5
he has bought, was a reaction to the price-fixing upstream having raised his costs and which part 
was a reaction to B’s having been induced to compete less fiercely. Both effects would be as-
cribed to the cartel.  
One may have doubts about the wisdom or the viability of such a regime in which cartel mem-
bers are held responsible for the entire change in the downstream system that their price-fixing 
induces. However, if one wants to shield cartel members from indirect-purchaser claims that are 
based on the entire change in the downstream system that their price-fixing has induced, one 
must at the same time reject a defense against direct purchasers that is based on this very change 
in the downstream system. Consistency in the treatment of causation in assessing damages for 
direct and indirect purchasers then requires that, in assessing damages for a direct buyer A, the 
actions of A’s competitors should be held constant and should not be treated as part of the pack-
age of actions whose effects are being considered.  
Before I turn to the actual analysis, a disclaimer is in order. This paper does not attempt to pro-
vide an encompassing analysis of private damages in antitrust law. It merely tries to present the 
economist’s view of what damages are in price-fixing cases and to relate this view to legal 
analysis. No account is given of private damages in other antitrust cases. No account is given of 
the incentives that private parties have to bring such cases or of the relation between private en-
forcement and private damages to public enforcement and public fines or public leniency pro-
grams.  
I also leave out the empirical question of what data and what procedures might be used to meas-
ure damages in any particular case. This question is important, but, before one addresses it, one 
needs to know what one is actually looking for, i.e., one needs to resolve the conceptual issue of 
what acts are to be considered as constituting the offense and what effects are to be taken into 
account as one assesses damages by comparing actual outcomes with the hypothetical situation 
that would have arisen if the cartel had not been formed. 
2.  The Effects of Price-fixing When Buyers Are Final Consumers 
2.1 Economic  Analysis 
Before considering passing-on effects, I first discuss the assessment of damages from price-
fixing in a market where all buyers are final consumers. Suppose that n suppliers of a good agree 
to sell the good at the monopoly price p
M. I buy an amount d(p
M) from supplier 1. What damage 
do I suffer from the illegal price-fixing? 
To answer this question, one must specify a standard of comparison. Such a standard can be 
based on normative considerations or on a prediction of what would have happened in the hypo-
thetical world in which the offense would not have occurred. One suggestion might be that, 
without the illegal agreement, each supplier would have been free to offer the good at the price 
p
M anyway so that, in fact, I have not suffered any damage at all, at least by comparison to this 
situation. In opposition to this suggestion, one could argue that such an outcome would be 
unlikely, because competition would induce suppliers to set prices below p
M, or unacceptable, 
because monopoly prices violate abuse-of-dominance rules.   6
Assuming that all suppliers produce the good at the same constant cost   c   per unit, one might 
predict the competitive outcome to involve every supplier charging a price equal to c.
8  This pre-
diction would correspond to the Bertrand model of competition among price-setting suppliers. 
However, if the number of suppliers is small, this prediction is not compatible with the Cournot 
model of oligopolistic competition in which suppliers choose quantities that they want to supply, 
leaving the market to find an equilibrating price.
9 It does, however, correspond to a normative 
standard that assesses prices in relation to costs or in relation to the prices that would prevail un-
der “perfect competition”. In the following, I will assume that the competitive price  p
C = c  is in 
fact the appropriate standard of comparison. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Effects of Price-fixing on Direct Purchasers Who Are Not Competitors 
 
With this standard of comparison, the effects of the price-fixing are illustrated in Figure 1. In this 
figure, the downward sloping curve  d( . ) indicates my demand at different prices. At the cartel 
price, I buy d(p
M) units of the good; at the competitive price  p
C = c, I buy d(p
C) units. One may 
presume that  d(p
C) is greater than d(p
M), i.e., that the price-fixing reduces my demand for the 
good. The cartelization thus has two effects: 
  An allocative effect by which my demand is reduced from d(p
C) to d(p
M) and  
  A distributive effect by which I am made to pay the amount  p
M d(p




M) units of the good that I actually purchase.  
What are the consequences of these effects on the participants’ welfare?  First, the distributive 
effect raises the supplier’s profits by the amount (p
M - p
C)d(p
M), which corresponds to the area of 
the darkly shaded rectangle with sides (p
M - p
C) and d(p
M) in Figure 1. The distributive effect 
                                        
8   If different suppliers have different costs, the analysis would be more complicated, but the principles would 
be similar. In this case, the competitive outcome would be identified with the second-lowest cost level, i.e., 
the lowest price at which at least two suppliers would be willing to provide the good. 
9   For textbook treatments of oligopolistic competition, see Ch. 5 in Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Or-
ganization, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, or Ch. 12 in Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, und 
Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995.   7
lowers my welfare
10 by the same amount (p
M - p
C)d(p
M). Second, the allocative effect lowers my 
own welfare without affecting the supplier. This effect corresponds to the area of lightly shaded 
triangle with base (d(p
C) - d(p
M)) and height (p
M - p





C)/2. The difference d(p
C) - d(p
M) is the foregone quantity; the term (p
M - p
C) /2  a meas-
ure of the utility loss per unit of foregone quantity. This latter term is equal to the difference be-
tween (p
M + p
C) /2, a measure of the average utility per unit of the foregone quantity,
11 and the 
competitive price p
C, which I should pay for each unit in the alternative situation when I buy the 
amount d(p
C). 
From an economic perspective, therefore, the private damages suffered by the buyer as a result 
of the cartel’s raising the price from p
C to p









of the damages that he suffers from the distributive and allocative effects taken together. I will 
refer to this quantity as the economic private damages of the buyer. In Figure 1, it corresponds to 
the sum of the darkly shaded rectangle and the lightly shaded triangle, i.e. to the shaded trape-
zoid between the two horizontal lines at prices p
C and p
M, the vertical axis, and the demand 
curve.  
The sum of private damages that the buyer suffers from the distributive and allocative effects of 
the price-fixing can be interpreted as an externality that the cartel imposes on the buyer. As such, 
it provides a proper starting point for setting incentives. One may worry about the effects of the 
uncertainty of cartel detection. If cartel detection were assured, a rule awarding economic private 
damages to the buyer would effectively discourage cartel formation. If cartel detection is uncer-
tain, additional incentive devices may be needed in order to counterbalance the positive incen-
tives for cartel formation that are provided by the prospect of  gains when the cartel is not de-
tected. Even in this case though, the externality that the cartel imposes on the buyer when it re-
mains undetected provides a suitable starting point for setting proper incentives. However, I will 
not go into this issue any further; instead, I will focus on the use of total private damages as a 
measure of the externality that the cartel imposes on the buyer.  
2.2  Economic Private Damages and the Assessment of Legal Liability 
How do these economic considerations fit into the legal framework that is provided by general 
tort law? Is an award of economic private damages to the buyer compatible with the principle 
that private damages should provide for equitable restitution and not serve as a source of enrich-
ment for the plaintiff?  
The answer to this question depends on the hypothetical alternative situation that is used as a 
reference point for assessing equitable restitution. If the alternative situation is construed as be-
ing one where the buyer is given the option to negotiate with any of the suppliers in the absence 
of a cartel agreement among suppliers and if one takes the decision autonomy of the suppliers in 
such negotiations for granted, one cannot reject the possibility that each supplier would insist on 
                                        
10   More precisely, the money equivalent of the welfare level that I attain.  
11   At d(p
M), the last unit purchased is worth p
M to the buyer, the first additional unit is worth roughly the same; 
as additional units are being purchased, their value decreases until it reaches approximately p
C at the quan-
tity d(p
C). The average (p
M + p
C)/2  is precise if the demand function is linear. Otherwise, it is an approxima-
tion; a precise measure would be given by the integral under the demand curve between d(p
M) and d(p
C).   8
the monopoly price p
M. In this case, there is no role at all for damages as a device for equitable 
restitution. 
If, instead, the alternative situation is construed as being one where the buyer is given the option 
to buy any quantity he wants at the competitive price p
C, the effect of the cartel is to replace this 
option with the option to buy any quantity he wants at the monopoly price p
M. In this case, to 
award economic private damages to the buyer is fully in accord with the notion of equitable res-
titution. The distributive effect corresponds to actual damages from overcharging on the amount 
d(p
M); the allocative effect corresponds to profits that are foregone because the loss of the option 
to buy at the price p
C induces the buyer to reduce the quantity that he wants to buy.  
Tort law as such provides little guidance as to how the hypothetical alternative situation is to be 
construed. In principle, either of the above constructions might be seen as fitting into the frame-
work of general tort law. However, the legal norm whose violation provides the plaintiff with a 
claim for damages provides some guidance on how the hypothetical alternative situation is to be 
construed.  
The first of the two constructions above is hardly compatible with the intentions of antitrust leg-
islation and jurisdiction when they provide for awarding damages to victims of antitrust viola-
tions. If damage claims were deemed to be moot because, even in the absence of a cartel agree-
ment, the supplier would have been free to insist on the cartel price p
M, this would negate the 
very notion that cartelization is an offense not only against the law, but also against the custom-
ers, who should therefore be put into a position to obtain restitution through the payment of dam-
ages. 
By contrast, the second construction is compatible with the intentions of antitrust legislation and 
jurisdiction. The notion that cartelization is an offense against customers for which they should 
be able to claim damages is based on the view that, in the absence of a cartel agreement, the cus-
tomers would have been able to purchase the good at a lower price. The notion that, without the 
cartel agreement, the buyer would have or should have the option to buy any quantity that he 
wants at the competitive price p
C = c is in tune with this very assessment.  
Given the diversity of models and experiences of oligopolistic markets, one may question 
whether the competitive price p
C = c would actually have prevailed in the absence of the cartel 
agreement. In most oligopolistic markets, this seems quite unlikely. However, the price p
C = c 
does correspond to the competitive-pricing norm that appears elsewhere in antitrust law. More-
over, by comparison to any alternative, it has the advantage of being relatively simple. The at-
tempt to ascertain the cost   c  in an actual court proceeding is difficult enough; but it is immeas-
urably easier than the attempt to ascertain the precise nature of the strategic interdependence be-
tween, say, two large and three small suppliers.  
Treating the alternative situation as one where the buyer has an option to buy any quantity that 
he wants at the competitive price p
C and therefore awarding economic private damages to the 
buyer, would be analogous to the treatment of damages for breach of contract when the buyer 
has a contract providing for the purchase of the quantity d(p
C) at the price p
C. If the seller 
breaches this contract and replaces it by the option to buy any quantity that the buyer wants at 
the monopoly price p
M, the buyer is also compensated for foregone profits, as well as actual 
losses. From the perspective of legal doctrine, there may be a difference between damages in 
contracts and damages in torts. Whereas in contract law, we focus on the buyer’s interest in see-
ing a contract fulfilled, in antitrust law, we focus on the potential buyer’s interest in having sup-
pliers desist from price-fixing. However, if the legal norm that provides the basis for damage   9
claims against price-fixing is construed with reference to a competitive-pricing norm, the poten-
tial buyer’s chance to buy any quantity that he wants at the competitive price p
C = c should, at 
least in principle, be deemed to be within the sphere of protection provided by the law.  
However, awarding economic private damages requires a departure from current practice, not 
only in those countries that haven’t allowed for private damages from antitrust violations at all, 
but also in the United States. Jurisdiction in the United States has awarded damages from what I 
have called “the distributive effect” of the cartel, i.e., the actual amount overcharged, but not 
from the allocative effect.
12 I consider this to be problematic.  
There are good reasons for being cautious about the allocative effect in practice. After all, it 
raises a serious information problem: In addition to the actual price p
M and quantity d(p
M), which 
may be deemed to be verifiable, in any given case, one needs to ascertain not only the competi-
tive price p
C, but also the quantity d(p
C) that the buyer would have purchased at the price p
C. As-
certaining p
C with any degree of reliability is difficult enough and may cause problems even for 
assessing the distributive effect of the cartelization. Ascertaining d(p
C) may be close to impossi-
ble because this information is privy to the buyer, and he has no incentive to be honest in report-
ing it.
13 We may therefore want to be cautious about accepting claims on the basis of foregone 
profits from additional units that would have been purchased if the price had been p
C rather than 
p
M. Indeed, the plaintiffs themselves may want to refrain from such claims because they fear 
their repercussions for court proceedings. Such repercussions may range from unconscionable 
delays due to the greater complexity of the claims to an increased risk of losing in court alto-
gether.  
However, these difficulties of dealing with the allocative effect in practice should not lead us to 
neglect it in principle. At the conceptual level, there is no problem in allowing for the allocative 
effect, in particular, no issue of incompatibility with general tort law. Moreover, as will be seen 
in the following section, neglect of the allocative effect at the conceptual level is a source of se-
rious flaws in thinking about passing-on effects. 
3.  The Effects of Price-fixing When Buyers Are Downstream  
Monopolists 
3.1 Economic  Analysis 
In this and the following section, I consider the case where the cartel members are selling to 
other firms that use the good in question as an input into their own production and sell their own 
outputs to final consumers downstream. To distinguish these firms from the input producers up-
stream, I refer to them as “intermediaries”, without thereby implying that they are intermediaries 
in the usual sense of merchants, banks, etc. In this section, I treat the case where each intermedi-
ary is a monopolist in his own downstream market. In the following section, I will study the case 
where intermediaries are in monopolistic competition with each other.  
                                        
12   This was established in American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Mandeville Island Farms, 195 F:2d_622 (9th Cir., 
1952). For a critique, see Schinkel et al. (supra fn. 6). 
13   One might, however think about estimating it. For example, aggregate market data might permit an econo-
metric estimation of the aggregate demand function D(.) of all buyers. This estimation would provide a pre-
diction of the aggregate demand D(p
C) at the competitive price p
C. Under the assumption that, when the 
price drops from p
M to p
C, individual demands increase in proportion to the increase in aggregate demand, 
one predicts d(p
C) to be equal to d(p
M) D(p
C)/D(p
M).    10
If intermediaries are monopolists in the downstream markets, there is no role for strategic inter-
action among intermediaries. I can therefore focus on the effects of price-fixing upstream on one 
intermediary in isolation, just as, in the preceding section, I focussed on the effects of price-
fixing on one consumer. Let   q   denote the output price of this intermediary. At a given output 
price   q, the intermediary faces an aggregate demand E(q). If he satisfies this demand, he obtains 
the revenue R(q) = q E(q). He also incurs a cost because he has to buy the inputs he uses to pro-
duce the quantity E(q). I distinguish between the input he buys from the cartel members and an 
aggregate of all other inputs. For simplicity, I set the price of the latter equal to one. If he buys d 
units of the former and y units of the latter, his cost is K = pd + y. His overall profit is  
R(q) – pd – y. 
For a given input price  p, he chooses his own output price  q, as well as his input purchases  d  
and  y  so as to maximize this profit under the constraint that the input combination (d, y) is suf-
ficient to produce the output E(q) that he needs to satisfy his customers’ demand at the price  q . I 
denote the resulting choices as q(p), d(p), y(p). These choices provide him with the maximal 
profit  
V(p) = R(q(p)) – pd(p) – y(p). 
What are the effects of price-fixing upstream? To study this question, I again assume that the 
cartel members charge the monopoly price p
M, and that, without the cartelization, the price 
would be equal to the competitive price p
C. The intermediary reacts to the price-fixing by raising 
his output price from  q(p
C) to q(p





M). His profit changes from V(p
C) to V(p
M). I claim that his profit decreases and that 
the amount of the decrease is no less than the overcharge (p
M - p
C)d(p
M) on the amount that he 
actually purchases from the cartel members. 
The argument that supports this claim is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the impli-
cations of different output prices chosen by the intermediary when the input price is p
C. Figure 3 
shows the effects of the input-price increase from p
C to p
M on the intermediary’s profits. The 
curve E( . ) in these figures represents the downstream customers’ demand function. For any 
price  q  that the intermediary sets, E(q) is the demand that he encounters. For q, the revenue 
R(q) is equal to the area of the rectangle “under the demand curve”, i.e. the rectangle to the 
southwest of the demand point (E(q), q) in the figure, which has sides of lengths E(q) and q.  
On the cost side, Figures 2 and 3 are drawn under the assumption that the intermediary uses only 
one input, the one he buys from the cartel members, and that he needs δ units of the input to pro-
duce one unit of his output. As will be seen below, the analysis does not hinge on this assump-
tion. Given this assumption, the cost of producing any amount E is  δ p times E . Thus, the in-
termediary’s cost is δ p E(q)  if he chooses the output price  q  and serves the demand E(q). He 
works with a constant unit cost k(p) =  δ p. For p = p
C, this constant unit cost is represented by 
the horizontal line with intercept k(p
C) = δ p
C. For any output price q that the intermediary might 
choose, the cost of serving the demand E(q) corresponds to the rectangle between this horizontal 
line, the axes, and a vertical line at the level of the demand E(q).    11
 
 
Figure 2: The intermediary’s choice when the input price is p
C 
 
Now consider the intermediary’s choice of output price when the input price is p
C. For any q that 
he might choose, his profit is (q – k(p
C)) E(q). He chooses the price q(p
C) to maximize his profit. 
Figure 2 illustrates the tradeoff that underlies this choice. The maximal profit, (q(p
C)  – k(p
C)) 
E(q(p
C)),  corresponds to the area of the rectangle with side lengths (q(p
C)  – k(p
C)) and E(q(p
C)). 
If he were to choose any higher price, e.g., the price q(p
M) in Figure 2, he would earn more per 
unit that he sells, but he would also sell fewer units. He is thus trading off the effects of an in-
crease in per-unit revenue against a business-loss effect. The implications of these effects for his 
profits are represented by the shaded areas in the figure: 





of his margin times the quantity reduction; this product is equal to the area of the lightly shaded 
rectangle in the figure. 
The per-unit revenue effect raises his profits by the product q(p
M) - q(p
C)  times E(q(p
M)), the 
price increase times with the quantity that he actually sells at the higher price; this product is 
equal to the area of the darkly shaded rectangle in the figure.  
The very definition of q(p
C) as a price that maximizes the intermediary’s profits when the input 
price is p
C implies that, if he were to move to any higher price, the business-loss effect would 




C),  the lightly shaded area in Figure 2 is necessarily larger than the darkly 
shaded area.  
                                        
14   If he were to move to a price below p
C, the effect of lower per-unit revenues must outweigh the business 
gain effect of the move, so that his overall profit would also decrease.  
   12
 
 
Figure 3: The effects of an input price increase on the intermediary’s profits 
 
On the basis of these preliminaries, Figure 3 exhibits the effects of an input price increase from 
p
C to p
M. The figure is the same as Figure 2, except that it also contains a horizontal line with 
intercept k(p
M) = δ p
M corresponding to the intermediary’s unit cost when the input price is p
M. 
The input price increase from p
C to p
M and the induced increase in the intermediary’s own output 
price from q(p
C)  to q(p
M)  have three effects on the intermediary’s profits: a per-unit revenue 
effect, a business-loss effect, and a cost effect. The per-unit revenue effect and the business-loss 
effect are the same as in Figure 2. They are again represented by the darkly and lightly shaded 
rectangles. The cost effect is given by the product of the increase k(p
M) – k(p
C) in unit costs 
times the quantity E(q(p
M)) that the intermediary actually sells at the higher price q(p
M); this 
product corresponds to the area of the rectangle that is drawn in black in the figure.  
Now we can pull the argument together: The total effect of the input price increase from p
C to p
M 
on the intermediary’s profits is given by the cost effect plus the business-loss effect minus the 
per-unit revenue effect, i.e. the sum of the areas of the black and light grey rectangles minus the 
area of the dark grey rectangle. From the previous discussion of Figure 2 and the comparison of 
the intermediary’s profits at q(p
C) and q(p
M)  when the input price is p
C, we know that the lightly 
shaded area in Figure 3 is larger than the darkly shaded area, i.e. that the business-loss effect of 
the output price increase from q(p
C) to q(p
M)  outweighs the per-unit revenue effect. Therefore 
the total effect of the input price increase from p
C to p
M  on the intermediary’s profits is a de-
crease, which is at least as large as the cost effect, the area of the black rectangle in the figure. 
Because  k(p) =  δ p for any  p,  this cost effect is actually equal to (p
M – p
C) times δ E(q(p
M)), 
which is just the overcharge on the amount d(p
M) = δ E(q(p
M)) of the input that the intermediary 
must purchase from the cartel members to satisfy the demand E(q(p
M)).  
To see that this conclusion holds quite generally, go back to the equation V(p) = R(q(p)) – pd(p) 
– y(p) for the maximum profits of the intermediary as a function of the input price p. Observe 
that, when the input price is  p
C, the intermediary would be free to choose the output price q(p
M) 
and to use the input combination d(p
M), y(p
M) to serve the demand E(q(p
M)). The fact that he   13
does not do so implies that, at the input price p




C). Thus, it must be the case that V(p


















M), it follows that  
V(p





which is precisely the claim that the overcharge on the actual purchase  d(p
M) is a lower bound 
for the detrimental effects of the input price increase on the intermediary’s profits. In this as-
sessment, all adjustments in the intermediary’s  output price and input demands are taken into 
account. There is no room for a passing-on defense to reduce the damage assessment below the 
actual overcharge. Proponents of the passing-on defense who try to do so anyway are simply 
forgetting about the business-loss effect that results from the intermediary’s price increase.  
What can be said about the actual size of the damage that is suffered by the intermediary? In the 
Appendix to this paper, I show that the answer to this question is again provided by Figure 1, 
where  d( . ) now is the intermediary’s demand function for the cartel good. The welfare loss that 
the intermediary suffers from the illegal price-fixing in the input market, i.e., the difference   
V(p
C)  −  V(p
M), is equal to the area of the shaded trapezoid between the two horizontal lines at 
prices p
C and p
M, the vertical axis and the demand curve; if the demand curve takes the linear 









of the distributive effect from the overcharge (p
M - p
C)d(p
M) and the allocative effect associated 
with the intermediary’s reducing his demand for the cartel good.  
The demand reduction here is due to (i) the intermediary’s substituting away from the cartel 
good and (ii) the intermediary’s producing less because his own price increase induces a busi-
ness-loss effect. Both adjustments make the intermediary better off than he would be otherwise 
and reduce his damages below the amount (p
M – p
C)d(p
C) which would be the overcharge if he 
continued to buy the quantity d(p
C). This observation highlights the grain of truth in the passing-
on defense: An assessment of damages according to the overcharge (p
M - p
C)d(p
C) on the quan-
tity that the intermediary would buy at the competitive price p
C would be exaggerated.  
However, the adjustments do involve a loss of profit opportunities. In particular, the business-
loss effect dominates the per-unit revenue effect of the intermediary’s own price increase.  




C). Considering only the distributive effect (p
M - p
C)d(p
M) and then applying the 
passing-on defense would amount to a fallacious double counting of passing-on effects, as well 
as a neglect of the allocative effect of the price-fixing.  
3.2  Implications for the Assessment of Legal Liabilities Towards Direct Buyers 
The economic analysis thus shows that there is no difference between the assessment of eco-
nomic private damages from price-fixing for a consumer and for an intermediary who is a down-
stream monopolist. If all effects are properly taken into account, the per-unit revenue effect of 
the intermediary’s own price increase, on which the passing-on defense builds, is dominated by 
the business-loss effect. If the business-loss effect for the intermediary is neglected, the passing-  14
on defense results in an inappropriate understatement of the economic private damages that the 
intermediary suffers from the price-fixing upstream.  
Given that there is no difference in principle between the assessment of economic private dam-
ages from price-fixing for a consumer and for an intermediary who is a downstream monopolist, 
there is no need to say anything more about the relation between the results of the economic 
analysis and the law. Everything that was said about this in Section 2 can be directly applied 
here. In particular, an assessment of economic private damages is legally mandated if the hypo-
thetical alternative situation that provides the standard for assessing equitable restitution is iden-
tified with the intermediary’s having an option to buy any quantity of the input that he wants at 
the competitive price p
C. In this assessment, the passing-on defense is already taken into account.  
As discussed in Section 2, there may be practical procedural reasons for neglecting allocative 
effects and limiting damages to the distributive effect, i.e., the overcharge (p
M - p
C)d(p
M) on the 
quantity that the intermediary actually buys at the price p
M. However, when this is done, it is no 
longer possible to employ a passing-on defense to reduce damages below the distributive effect. 
Any attempt to do so would be downright fallacious because, when all effects of the intermedi-
ary’s own price increase are taken into account, the damage that is suffered by the intermediary 
is never smaller than the damage from the distributive effect. Denying the passing-on defense 
while limiting damages to the overcharge is fully compatible with the principle that damage 
awards should not be a source of enrichment.
15 Any suggestion to the contrary must neglect the 
business-loss effect and is therefore flawed. 
3.3  Implications for the Assessment of Legal Liabilities Towards Indirect  
Purchasers 
What about indirect purchasers, i.e., what about the intermediary’s own clients? So far, they have 
played no role at all, except to the extent that their aggregate demand function E( . ) affects the 
intermediary’s profit maximization. If the price-fixing upstream induces the intermediary to raise 
his price from q(p
C) to q(p
M), the indirect purchasers suffer a welfare loss. Analysis of this wel-
fare loss proceeds along the same lines as in the preceding section, i.e., there are an allocative 
effect and a distributive effect. For an individual consumer with demand function e( . ), these 
effects are illustrated in Figure 4, which is the same as Figure 1, except that we are now dealing 
with the intermediary’s output rather than the cartel members’ output.  
 
 
                                        
15   One might have qualms about the intermediary’s own exploitation of monopoly power in the downstream 
market. However, that is quite another matter, which needs to be treated on its own merits. In some cases, 
e.g. when the intermediary’s monopoly position is the result of a patent, his exploitation of this position 
would be unproblematic anyway.   15
 
Figure 4: The Effects of Upstream Price-fixing on Indirect Buyers When Direct Buyers Are Not in 
Competition With Each Other  
 









when the price-fixing upstream induces the intermediary to raise his price from q(p
C) to q(p
M). In 
Figure 3, this corresponds to the shaded trapezoid between the two horizontal lines at prices 
q(p
C) and q(p
M), the vertical axis, and the demand curve e( . ). The first term corresponds to the 
distributive effect, again shown by a darkly shaded rectangle, the second term to the allocative 
effect, again shown by a lightly shaded triangle. 
The economic private damages suffered by the downstream consumer have little to do with the 




M)) corresponds to the revenue enhancement per unit sold that an intermediary ob-
tains when he raises his price. However, as explained above, the revenue enhancement per unit 
sold that the intermediary enjoys when he raises his price is dominated by a business-loss effect. 
Moreover, at the level of the intermediary, there is no benefit that would correspond to the allo-
cative effects for the downstream consumers.  
From an economic perspective, the notion that damage awards should induce offenders to inter-
nalize all the external effects that they induce would warrant indirect as well as direct purchasers 
having the right to claim damages from the cartel. How this consideration would fit into the legal 
framework that is provided by general tort law is not a question that concerns the passing-on de-
fense, but, rather, a question of what notion of causation one is relying on and what hypothetical 
alternative situation serves as a standard of comparison in assessing damages.  
Along the lines of the argument in Section 2, providing the indirect purchaser with standing to 
claim damages against the cartel members would correspond to the notion that, without the cartel 
agreement, the indirect purchaser would have an option to buy whatever quantity he wants at the 
price q(p
C), which the intermediary would charge if the price of the input upstream was p
C.  
   16
At a conceptual level, this raises the question to what extent the intermediary’s response to the 
price-fixing upstream should be ascribed to the cartel members. At a practical level, it raises the 
question of how q(p
C) is to be ascertained. After all, this price is chosen by the intermediary and 
depends on the parameters of his profit function, rather than anything in the domain of the cartel 
members (except for the price that they charge). I will return to these questions below, after I 
have studied the case where the direct purchasers from the cartel are in competition with each 
other. This case raises similar questions, and it seems best to discuss these questions together.  
At this point, it suffices to note that neither of these questions has anything to do with how the 
passing-on defense against direct buyers is treated. If the direct buyer is awarded damages ac-
cording to both the allocative and the distributive effects of the price-fixing the passing-on de-
fense is implicitly respected, and there is no reason to deny passing-on arguments brought by an 
indirect buyer. If the direct buyer is awarded less, in particular, if he is awarded only the actual 
overcharge, the same conclusion holds a fortiori. The United States Supreme Court reasoned to 
the contrary because it neglected the business-loss effect that resulted from the direct buyer’s 
own price increase in response to price-fixing upstream. This neglect in turn was due to the in-
sufficient attention paid to the allocative effects of the price-fixing upstream. 
4.  The Effects of Price-fixing When Direct Buyers Are Competing 
With Each Other 
4.1 Economic  Analysis 
To conclude the economic analysis of private damages from price-fixing, I consider the case 
where intermediaries are in competition with each other in their downstream markets. I will not 
actually specify any details of the strategic interdependence which this creates. I merely consider 
a reduced form in which the downstream demand that is faced by any intermediary i depends not 
just on this intermediary’s own price qi, but also on the prices that are charged by the other in-
termediaries. For simplicity, I assume that this influence is captured by some index   Q   of the 
other intermediaries’ prices.
16 The demand that intermediary  i  faces thus takes the form Ei(qi, 
Q), rather than just Ei(qi). An increase in the competing firms’ prices is assumed to make the in-
termediary’s own offering more attractive to consumers so that Ei(qi, Q) is increasing in Q, as 
well as decreasing in qi.
17  
I again consider the effects of the cartelization upstream on the profits of one particular interme-
diary. To simplify the notation, I drop the subscript  i  for this intermediary unless there is a need 
for an explicit distinction between intermediaries. Thus, I write E(q, Q) instead of Ei(qi, Q), 
without thereby presuming that demand functions or prices are all the same.  
I continue to assume that there are two inputs, one that is purchased from the cartel members and 
one that is not cartelized. The latter should again be interpreted as an aggregate of all other in-
puts; its price is again set equal to one. If the intermediary charges his own customers the price q 
                                        
16   Depending on the nature of the competition, Q might be an average, or Q might be the minimum, of the 
prices charged by the other intermediaries. 
17   If Ei( . , . ) is a continuous function, the underlying model of consumer preferences is one where the inter-
mediaries’ outputs are treated as imperfect substitutes, i.e., differentiated products. The case of perfect sub-
stitutes, i.e., homogeneous products, can be obtained as a limiting case of this specification.   17
and if he purchases x units of the first input and y units of the second, he obtains the overall 
profit  
R(q, Q) – px – y, 
where R(q, Q) = q E(q, Q) is the revenue obtained from selling E(q, Q) units of output at the 
price q. Apart from the intermediary’s own choices, this profit depends on the index Q of the 
prices set by his competitors, as well as the price p at which he can buy the first input.  
For given values of p and Q, the intermediary may again be assumed to choose his own price q 
and his inputs x and y so as to maximize his overall profit under the constraint that the input 
combination (x, y) be sufficient for him to produce the amount E(q, Q) that he needs to satisfy 
his customers’ demand. I denote his choices as q(p, Q), d(p, Q), and y(p, Q). These choices pro-
vide him with the maximal profit 
V(p, Q) = R(q(p, Q), Q) – p d( p, Q) – y(p, Q). 
If Q could be taken as given, the analysis of the preceding section would be applicable without 
change. When cartel raises the intermediary’s input price from p
C to p
M, his maximal profit is 
lowered from V(p
C, Q) to V(p
M, Q). In a price-quantity diagram for the cartel good, the size of 
the loss would again be measured by the area of a trapezoid, this time between the vertical axis, 
the two horizontal lines at the prices p
C and p
M, and the demand curve d( . , Q) that corresponds 
to the given index Q.  
However, the index of prices that are charged by the other intermediaries cannot be taken as 
given! If the upstream producers all raise their price from  p
C to p
M, this also affects all the other 
intermediaries that use the cartel members’ product as an input into their own production. Pre-
sumably, therefore, these intermediaries also want to raise their output prices. As they do so, the 
value of the index Q goes up. This raises the demand for the intermediary’s output at any price   
q   that he might charge, i.e., the demand curve E( . , Q) that he faces is shifted to the right (see 
Figure 5). This outward shift is likely to affect the intermediary’s price and input choices. In par-
ticular, he may need more inputs to satisfy his customers’ demand than he would if   Q   re-
mained unchanged. 
In trying to assess how large these effects might be, one must come to terms with the strategic 
interdependence of the different intermediary firms. On the one hand, the output price   q   that 
the given intermediary finds optimal depends on the index   Q   of the other intermediaries’ 
prices, as well as the input price   p.  On the other hand, each of the other intermediaries is en-
gaged in a similar calculation, with an index of prices charged by their competitors, into which 
the output price   q   of the first intermediary enters directly.  
 
   18
 
 
Figure 5: The Effects of Upstream Price-fixing on Downstream Demand for a Direct Buyer When 
Direct Buyers Are in Competition With Each Other  
 
In this setting, each participant’s behaviour depends on his expectations of all the other partici-
pants’ behaviours. For any value   p   of the input price, an equilibrium induced by p is given by 
a list of price and input choices, one for each intermediary, such that, given the other intermedi-
aries’ choices, each intermediary is happy with the choices that the list stipulates for him. For a 
given intermediary, the triple q*(p), d*(p), y*(p) that is stipulated for him must correspond to the 
choices q(p, Q*(p)), d(p, Q*(p)), y(p, Q*(p))  that maximize his profit when the input price is p 
and when the index of prices charged by the other intermediaries takes the value Q*(p) that re-
sults from the strategy choices that are stipulated for the other intermediaries. Thus, one must 
have  
q*(p) = q(p, Q*(p)), d*(p) = d(p, Q*(p)), and  y*(p) = y(p, Q*(p)).
18 
If any input price p induces exactly one equilibrium of the strategic interaction between interme-
diaries,
19  there is no ambiguity in saying that the increase in the upstream price from p
C to p
M 




M) rather than q*(p
C), d*(p
C), and y*(p
C) and the index of 
prices charged by the other intermediary firms is Q*(p
M) rather than Q*(p
C); the price-fixing up-
stream affects the intermediary’s behaviour both directly and indirectly, as he adjusts to the 
change in the prices that his competitors charge as well as the increase in the input price.  
 
                                        
18   In the special case where the downstream demand function E( . , . ) takes the same form for every intermedi-
ary firm, all intermediaries have the same profit functions. In this case, the equilibrium may be presumed to 
be symmetric in the sense that all intermediaries end up making the same choices q*(p), d*(p), y*(p). The 
equilibrium value of the index Q may then be identified with the common price q*(p); one may set Q*(p) = 
q*(p). The common value of Q*(p) and q*(p) must then be a solution to the equation  q* = q(p, q*). In this 
equation, q* enters in two functions, as the price charged by the maximizing intermediary, and as the price 
that this intermediary expects to be charged by his competitors.   
19   There is not, in general, any reason why this should be so. I will return to this issue below.     19
Figure 6 illustrates the effects on the intermediary’s demand for the cartelized input. In this fig-
ure,  d*( . ) = d( . , Q*( . )) is the intermediary’s equilibrium demand curve. This curve  takes 
account of the endogeneity of Q*( . ); d( . , Q*(p
C)) and d( ., Q*(p
M)) are the intermediary’s de-
mand curve for fixed values Q*(p
C) and Q*(p
M) of the index of his competitor’s prices. By defi-
nition, d*( . ) intersects d( . , Q*(p
C)) at the price p
C  and d( ., Q*(p
M)) at the price p
M. The equi-
librium demand curve d*( . ) is steeper, i.e., less elastic, than the curves d( . , Q*(p
C)) and d( . , 
Q*(p
M)). The difference in elasticities reflects the fact that, when the upstream price goes up and 
the intermediary raises his own output price in response, at least some of the business-loss effect 
is compensated by a business-gain effect that is due to the other intermediaries raising their out-
put prices as well.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Effects of Upstream Price-fixing on a Direct Buyer’s Upstream Demand When Direct 
Buyers Are in Downstream Competition With Each Other  
 
What can be said about welfare effects of the cartelization upstream? Any indirect buyer suffers 
from the fact that he faces higher prices from all intermediary firms. The resulting welfare de-
crease again consists of an allocative effect as he reduces his purchases and a distributive effect 
as he pays more for the purchases he still makes. The distributive effect of the cartelization up-




M)) of the 
difference between the prices charged by the intermediary in the two situations with the quantity 
e(q*(p
M), Q*(p
M)) that the consumer purchases in the cartel situation. The allocative effect de-
pends on the functioning of the competition among intermediaries and on the degree of product 
differentiation between the different intermediaries. Therefore, there is no simple and generally 
applicable way to compute this effect. In particular, as the index movement from Q*(p
C) to 
Q*(p
M) shifts the indirect buyer’s demand curve, there does not seem to be any way to relate the 
allocative effect to his demand behaviour in the market.  
As for the intermediaries, they suffer from the fact that they face higher input prices, but they 
benefit from the fact that their competitors also face higher input prices. The latter effect en-
hances the distributive gains that they get from their own downstream customers. Indeed, this 
effect can be so strong that it outweighs the direct allocative and distributive effects of the input   20
price increase. The intermediary’s equilibrium profit V(p
M, Q*(p
M)) under price-fixing upstream 
is then actually larger than the equilibrium profit V(p
C, Q*(p
C)) that he gets if the upstream sup-
pliers charge the competitive price p
C. The overall effect of the upstream cartelization on the in-
termediary can thus be a welfare gain, rather than a welfare loss.  
To indicate why this can happen, I consider a particular example of the general structure consid-
ered here. In this example, there are many intermediaries, and all of them face a demand function 
of the same form. The demand Ei(qi, Q) that is faced by intermediary  i  when he charges the 
price qi and when the index of prices charged by the other intermediaries takes the value Q is 
given as a product  
Ei(qi, Q) = η(Q) f(qi/Q) 
of a term η(Q), which depends only on the index  Q,  and a term f(qi/Q), which depends only on 
the ratio of the intermediary’s own price  qi to the index  Q. I also assume that, when the input 
price is  p, all intermediaries produce at the same unit cost k(p), which, moreover, is independent 
of the quantity produced. Any one intermediary’s profits thus take the form 
(qi - k(p)) η(Q) f(qi/Q). 
The dependence of profits on qi   thus takes the same form for all intermediaries  i, and, for any p 
and Q, the profit-maximizing prices qi  may be taken to be the same for all i . One may suppose 
that an equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., that, for any p, the intermediaries all choose the same price 
qi = q*(p), and the index  Q takes the same value as the common price, i.e., Q*(p) = q*(p). An 
example might be  
q*(p) = (1+m) k(p), 
which corresponds to a constant markup over unit cost.
20 Equilibrium profits of an intermediary 
are equal to (q*(p) – k(p)) times his demand, i.e., 
(q*(p) – k(p)) η( Q*(p)) = m  k(p) η((1+m)k(p))  f(1). 
It is quite possible for this expression to be increasing in  p . In fact, it must be increasing if the 
elasticity of the function η( . ) is less than one, so that a 1 % increase in Q causes η(Q) to de-
crease by less than 1 %. In this case, the intermediaries’ equilibrium profits increase when the 
cartel price increase raises the their unit costs from k(p
C) to k(p
M).  
The underlying logic is the following: In a symmetric equilibrium, with q*(p) = Q*(p), the 
amount that any one intermediary sells depends mainly on the term η(Q*(p)) = η((1+m)k(p)). By 
contrast, the term f(qi/Q) plays no role because the ratio qi/Q is just equal to one. By contrast, at 
the level of individual profit maximization, behaviour is driven by the intermediaries’ concerns 
about the term f(qi/Q), which captures the reaction of demand to a deviation of qi from the aver-
age Q. At this level, the term η(Q) in the demand specification is irrelevant because the individ-
ual intermediary believes that he cannot affect it.  
If the product Q η(Q) is an increasing function of Q, the intermediaries all benefit from a joint 
increase in their prices. However, individually, they do not take this effect into account.  
                                        
20   This constant markup rule actually corresponds to an equilibrium if the term f(qi/Q) in the demand specifica-
tion takes the form (Q/qi)
1/(1-a) where a = 1/(1+m). This demand specification in turn is derived from con-
sumers’ utility maximization if utility depends on the amount e(i) purchsed from intermediary  i  only 
through the aggregate [ ∫ e(i)a di ]
1/a .         21
The upstream cartel helps them to overcome this deficit. The increase in the intermediaries’ unit 
cost k(p) that is induced by the price-fixing upstream raises the price  
qi = q*(p) that each intermediary charges as well as the index Q*(p) = q*(p). If the elasticity of 
the function η( . ) is less than one, this causes the product q*(p) η(q*(p)) to increase. To be sure, 
the cost k(p) η(q*(p)) is also increasing, but, with an equilibrium output price determined by a 
constant markup over unit cost, the revenue increase exceeds the cost increase. As the profit   m 
k(p) η((1+m)k(p)) f(1) is increasing in k(p), we may think of the upstream cartel as providing the 
intermediaries with a substitute for a cartel of their own.  
This discussion should not be interpreted as saying that the intermediary firms necessarily gain 
from the price-fixing upstream. The example merely indicates that such a gain is possible. In-
deed, for the very example given, the intermediary firms lose from the price-fixing upstream if 
the elasticity of the function η( . ) is greater than one, so that the product k(p)η((1+m)k(p)) de-
creases when p and k(p) are increased. However, even in this case, the intermediaries draw some 
benefit from the fact that the higher input price raises not only their own costs, but also the equi-
librium prices of their competitors. 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any way to relate the business-gain effect from the in-
crease in Q*( p ) to the participants’ demand behaviour in the markets. In particular, the equilib-
rium demand curve d*( . ), which reflects not only the direct effects of upstream prices, but also 
the indirect effects that occur through changes in the equilibrium index Q*( . ), cannot be used to 
assess any welfare effects of the cartelization upstream.  
4.2  Legal Liabilities and the Assessment of Causation 
If we want legal damages to reflect the externalities that are caused by the price-fixing upstream, 
we should call for a regime that allows each affected party to claim economic private damages 





M)) between his equilibrium profits when the upstream price is p
C and when it is p
M, 
and the indirect buyer could claim the sum of allocative and distributive effects that he suffers 
because the price increase upstream raises the prices that he has to pay the intermediaries.   
However, such a regime would involve conceptual and procedural problems because the effects 
of the cartelization on the outcomes of competition between the direct buyers are difficult to 
handle. These effects shift part of the economic private damages from direct to indirect buyers. 
In dealing with the claims of indirect buyers, one must deal with the same questions as in the 
preceding section: To what extent is it appropriate to ascribe the intermediaries’ responses to the 
price-fixing upstream to the cartel members? And: how is one to ascertain how the downstream 
prices to which the indirect buyer is exposed depend on the upstream prices of the cartel mem-
bers? In the present setting, with competition among the intermediaries, these questions are even 
more difficult than before. Whereas before, an intermediary’s reaction to the price-fixing up-
stream was a simple matter of optimization, in the present context, it is a matter of equilibrium 
interaction as all intermediaries jointly react to the price-fixing. If part of the increase in down-
stream prices is due to the effects of strategic interdependence among intermediaries, is it clear 
that the upstream suppliers could or should be held liable for this part of the downstream price 
increase? 
   22
Economists think about causality in terms of the joint dependence of all the endogenous vari-
ables of a given system on all the exogenous variables.
21 In the present instance, the cartel price, 
as an exogenous variable, affects all the intermediaries’ downstream prices jointly. In a more 
complicated setting, one might also think of effects in additional markets. For instance, a cartel 
of oil producers might induce buyers to switch from oil to natural gas. This might raise the price 
of gas. Should we think of the welfare loss that is suffered by gas users as being the basis for 
claiming damages against the oil cartel? If so, how far along this line do we go? Are we not 
overtaxing the notion of legal responsibility if legal liability encompasses all the indirect effects, 
as well as the direct effects, including those indirect effects that arise from the “equilibrium reac-
tions” of other people, i.e., fully responsible individual decision makers, to the initial violation? 
In this context, one should also appreciate that, for a given constellation of exogenous variables, 
the system of endogenous variables may have more than one “equilibrium”.
22 In this case, we do 
not have any theory as to which of the different equilibria would be realized. There may, how-
ever, be circumstances where a change in exogenous variables induces the system to “jump” dis-
continuously from one equilibrium to another. In this case, the induced changes in endogenous 
variables will not be at all commensurate with the change in exogenous variables. An example is 
shown in Figure 7, where, for input prices in an intermediate range that includes p
C, the strategic 
interdependence of direct buyers generates three equilibria, rather than one, and the cartel’s 
price-fixing induces a “jump” from the lower branch to the upper branch of the curve for Q* 
( . ).
23  Does it make sense to assign responsibility for such systemic reactions to the parties that 
are responsible for the illicit change in the input price? 
                                        
21   For a general discussion of the economist’s notion of causality, see Martin F. Hellwig, Zur Kategorie der 
Kausalität in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Max Planck Institute For Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, 
Preprint 10/2006, http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2006_10online.pdf. 
22   In the present context, a natural source of equilibrium multiplicity lies in the fact that the direct buyers’ 
prices are what is known as strategic complements: If one intermediary raises his price, this makes it more 
attractive for others to raise their prices as well. On the concept of strategic complements, see Jeremy I. Bu-
low, John D. Geanakoplos, and Paul D. Klemperer, Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Com-
plements, Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985), pp. 488 – 511; on strategic complementarity as a source 
of equilibrium multiplicity, see Russell Cooper and Andrew John, Coordinating Coordination Failures in 
Keynesian Models, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103 (1988), pp. 441 – 463. 
23   As discussed in Hellwig (supra fn. 17), p. 10, such a jump may be unavoidable if the exogenous parameter 
crosses a boundary at which the number of equilibria changes, here from three to one. Lest the reader con-
sider this to be a purely academic notion: The 1987 stock market crash has been interpreted as an instance of 
such an unavoidable jump, see Gerard Genotte and Hayne L. Leland, Market Liquidity, Hedging and 
Crashes, American Economic Review 80 (1990), 999-1021. 
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Figure 7: Systemic Reactions to Price-fixing When There Are Multiple Equilibria 
 
Regardless of how we think about these questions at the conceptual level, we also have to appre-
ciate that, at a practical level, the indirect buyers do not stand much of a chance to establish cau-
sality in legal proceedings. In practice, the price-fixing upstream is unlikely to be the only vari-
able affecting the direct buyers’ pricing policies downstream. How is the indirect buyer to show 
which part of the price increase that he suffered was due to the cartelization upstream and which 
part was due to other factors? Nota bene, he has to do so in a setting where the direct buyers’ 
pricing policies downstream are determined jointly as an equilibrium response to the different 
factors affecting these firms’ business considerations! 
4.3  An Alternative Approach to Assessing Causation and Liability 
If one rejects the notion that the cartel members upstream should be held legally responsible for 
all direct and indirect effects of their price-fixing on the overall equilibrium of the system, this 
should have consequences for the treatment of damage awards to the direct buyers. After all, the 
benefits that the direct buyer obtains from passing-on effects are entirely due to the effects of the 
upstream cartelization on the prices charged by his competitors. If one takes the position that 
indirect buyers should not be able to claim damages against the cartel members for the shift in 
the equilibrium among intermediaries, then as a matter of conceptual consistency one should also 
take the position that the shift in the equilibrium among intermediaries should not be used as a 
defense against damage claims by the direct buyers. 
As before, the issue boils down to the question of what one takes to be the standard of compari-
son against which damages are being assessed. In the discussion so far, I have compared the 
overall equilibria of the system with and without price-fixing. An alternative approach would be 
to neglect equilibrium repercussions and to have each direct buyer claim damages on the basis 
that, if the cartel members had not conspired to fix the prices that they offer to him, then he   24
would have had the option to buy any quantity at the competitive price p
C. Taking everything 
else as given, this would have provided him with the profit V(p
C, Q*(p
M)).  
Under the latter construction of the hypothetical alternative situation, the direct buyer’s welfare 
loss from the price-fixing upstream would be assessed as V(p
C, Q*(p
M)) –  
V(p
M, Q*(p
M)). This quantity is always positive. By the same reasoning as in Section 3, it is 
equal to the shaded area in Figure 8 below, i.e., the area of the trapezoid between the two hori-
zontal lines at prices p
C and p
M, the vertical axis, and the intermediary’s demand curve  
d(  . , Q*(p
M)) that takes the value Q*(p
M) for the index of the other direct buyers’ prices as 
given. This area is never less than the area of the trapezoid between the two horizontal lines at 
prices p
C and p
M, the vertical axis, and the equilibrium demand curve d*( .). The latter in turn is 
never less than the area of the rectangle with bases d*(p
M) = d(p
M,Q*(p
M)) and height p
M – p
C, 
which represents the overcharge on the actual purchase d*(p
M).  
 
Figure 8: An Alternative Measure of Damages For the Direct Buyer 
 









M)) that the direct buyer 





M)) would thus conflict with the principle of general tort law 
whereby damage payments should provide for equitable restitution and should not provide the 
tort victim with an opportunity for enrichment.  
However, this objection presumes that the offensive acts for which the direct buyer claims dam-
ages comprise not only the fixed prices that the cartel members charged the direct buyer himself, 
but also the fixed prices that the cartel members charged the direct buyer’s competitors; in addi-
tion, the competitors’ reactions to this price-fixing must be treated as part of the offense. If, in-
stead, the offensive acts for which the direct buyer claims damages comprise only the fixed 
prices that the cartel members charged this particular buyer, or if the other direct buyers’ reac-
tions to the price-fixing upstream are not ascribed to the cartel members, a ceteris paribus as-
sumption concerning the index of prices charged by the direct buyer’s competitors is in fact ap-
propriate. The lawyer for the defense who calls for damages of the direct buyer to be awarded   25
net of all passing-on effects is in fact asserting that the cartel members should be held responsi-
ble for the equilibrium reactions of the direct buyer’s competitors. One may wonder whether the 
lawyer who presents this argument in a court case involving a direct buyer would as willingly 
adopt it in a case involving indirect buyers.  
Two aspects of this discussion are important. First, the assessment of damages that for a direct 
buyer is again not so much a matter of principles concerning equitable restitution, as it is a mat-
ter of what precisely one construes to be the hypothetical alternative situation that provides the 
standard for damage assessment. If the offensive acts for which a direct buyer A claims damages 
are identified with the fixing of prices for this particular buyer, without any concern for what 
happens to the other direct buyers, B, C, D, etc., and what these buyers are doing, one is led to 
reject any argument that depends on the reactions of B, C, D, etc. to the price-fixing upstream. In 
particular, one is led to reject any benefits that A obtains only because the demand function that 
he faces is shifted to the right when B, C, D, etc. all raise their prices. Once this is done, one is 
effectively back in the conceptual framework of the preceding section, where competition among 
direct buyers played no role and passing-on effects were shown to be reinforcing, rather than 
detracting from, the distributive effect.  
Second, it is desirable to have a certain consistency in the treatment of causation as a basis for 
assigning liability for damages. In particular, this treatment should be consistent across classes of 
claimants. If one asserts the principle that the effects of the price-fixing upstream on any partici-
pant are to be evaluated according to the overall change in the downstream equilibrium that is 
induced, then one should apply this principle to indirect and direct purchasers alike. If, alterna-
tively, one takes the view that the indirect purchasers cannot hold the cartel members responsible 
for the change in the equilibrium of the strategic interaction between direct buyers, then one 
should also apply this principle to the direct purchasers, i.e., one should grant any direct pur-
chaser the damages that are appropriate under the ceteris paribus assumption that the other direct 
purchasers prices remain the same.  
This concern for consistency is reminiscent of the objections that the United States Supreme 
Court voiced in Illinois Brick  against admitting a passing-on argument in a case involving an 
indirect purchaser while rejecting it in a case involving a direct purchaser. However, the issue at 
stake here is not the passing-on defense, but the business-gain effect that a direct purchaser en-
joys when his competitors respond to the cartel members’ price-fixing by raising their output 
prices.  The passing-on defense has been shown to be irrelevant in that the per-unit revenue ef-
fect is outweighed by the business-loss effect of the intermediary’s own price increase. The busi-
ness-gain effect is what really matters. The treatment of this effect depends on the notion of cau-
sation on which one is relying. This notion of causation should be the same for different classes 
of claimants. 
The concerns about incentives that the Supreme Court has voiced in Illinois Brick, as well as 
Hanover Shoe, would seem to suggest that the business-gain effect should be disregarded in 
cases involving direct, as well as indirect, purchasers. For direct purchasers, this would imply 





the shaded area in Figure 8. As mentioned above, a lower bound for this measure of damages is 
provided by the actual overcharge (p
M - p
C) d*(p
M). A somewhat tighter lower bound is provided 
by the trapezoid that lies to the left of the equilibrium demand function  
d*( . ). 
   26
What about indirect purchasers? The preceding discussion suggests that consistency in the treat-
ments across classes of claimants is not a question of standing, but a question of what notion of 
causation one is working with. If the business-gain effect is disregarded for direct purchasers, 
then the indirect purchasers cannot hold the cartel members liable for the entire change in the 
equilibrium among intermediaries. As a practical matter, this eliminates most damage claims by 
indirect purchasers because they are hardly able to prove which parts of the high prices that they 
have to pay can be ascribed to the price-fixing upstream.  
However, the assessment that indirect purchasers claims may be difficult to establish in practice 
is not a good reason for denying them standing. By giving the indirect purchasers standing to 
claim damages from the members of the upstream cartel, one can hope to counteract the incen-
tives for implicit collusion between the upstream cartel and the direct purchasers. As mentioned 
above, if the business-gain effect from rivals’ cost increases is sufficiently strong, the direct pur-
chasers actually benefit from the cartelization upstream.
24 Apart from follow-on suits, their in-
centives for suing cartel members for damages may therefore be weak even if damages are as-
sessed without considering business-gain effects. In such a situation, allowing the indirect pur-
chasers to sue for damages may provide a substitute threat against the upstream cartel. In some 
circumstances, the indirect purchasers may in fact be able to provide sufficient proof of a link 
between the high prices that they have to pay and the price-fixing upstream. In cases where the 
direct buyer follows a simple markup rule, e.g., when the direct buyer is a utility under a system 
of cost plus regulation, there should be no problem in doing so.
25 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
In its 2004 Special Report on the Reform of the Law Against Restraint of Competition,
26 the 
German Monopolies Commission recommended that the passing-on defense be prohibited while 
allowing follow-on purchasers standing to claim damages against antitrust offenders.
27 Because 
of the follow-on purchasers’ difficulties in providing sufficient evidence for the damages that 
they suffer, the latter recommendation was held to be of practical significance only in those cases 
where the link between upstream and downstream prices was obvious and the direct purchasers 
might have few incentives to sue for damages themselves.  
The recommendation to prohibit the passing-on defense was based on the same incentive consid-
erations that motivated the United States Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The 
argument here has gone one step further and shown that the passing-on defense is actually irrele-
vant to a proper assessment of damages. Once one takes account of the allocative effect, as well 
as the distributive effect, of price-fixing, one sees that potential gains from passing-on effects are 
matched by the business loss that occurs because the increase in the downstream price lowers 
demand. I suspect that the irrelevance of the passing-on defense has gone unnoticed because al-
locative effects have been given insufficient attention and because passing-on effects have been 
mixed up with downstream-competition effects, i.e., the business-gain effect that a direct buyer 
enjoys when the cartelization upstream induces his competitors to raise their prices. 
                                        
24   Schinkel et al. (supra fn. 5) show that this can be achieved quite generally, if the cartel members use more 
complicated pricing-and-rationing schemes for direct purchasers. 
25   On this point, see Blair and Harrison (supra fn. 5). 
26   Supra fn. 1. 
27   This was of course the recommendation of Blair and Harrison (supra fn. 5).   27
 
The effects of upstream cartelization on the outcomes of competition downstream are the most 
difficult issue in the assessment of damages for price-fixing. The analysis here proposes that this 
issue be handled analogously to the prevailing treatment of the passing-on defense, i.e., that, in 
awarding damages to a direct buyer from the cartel, the business-gain effect from price increases 
by the direct buyers’ competitors be disregarded. By a suitable treatment of causation, such a 
procedure is easily reconciled with general principles of tort law, in particular, the principle that 
damage awards should not be a source of enrich the victim of the original offense.  
The key to any assessment of damages in an antitrust case lies in the construction of the hypo-
thetical alternative situation by comparison to which damages are to be assessed. Because price-
fixing affects markets and markets are social systems, one has to come to terms with the fact that 
price-fixing may be changing the entire equilibrium of the system. Moreover, important parts of 
the change have to do with equilibrium interactions of different participants that cannot be re-
duced to simple sequences of causes and effects.  
If private enforcement of antitrust law is to become effective, as well as reliable – for all parties 
concerned! – a major task will be to develop clear and general principles for the treatment of 
causation and for the construction of the hypothetical alternative situation by comparison to 
which damages are to be assessed. This paper has addressed some of the issues that this involves 
and indicated some of the alternatives that one might want to rely on.       28
6. Appendix 
In this Appendix, I establish the claim, made in Section 3.1, that, for a direct buyer who is a 
downstream monopolist, the welfare loss from price-fixing in his input market is measured by 
the shaded trapezoid in Figure 1, the area between the two horizontal lines at prices p
C and p
M, 
the vertical axis, and the demand curve. For this purpose, I go back to the equation  
V(p) = R(q(p)) – pd(p) – y(p) 
for the maximum profits of the intermediary as a function of the input price p. At the input price 
p, the intermediary could also be making the choices q(p+Δ), d(p+Δ), y(p+Δ), which he makes 
when the input price is p+Δ. The fact that, at the price p, he prefers the choices q(p), d(p), y(p) 
means that  
V(p)  ≥   R(q(p+Δ)) – pd(p+Δ) – y(p+Δ). 
Because  
V(p+Δ) = R(q(p+Δ)) – (p+Δ) d(p+Δ) – y(p+Δ), 
it follows that  
V(p) ≥   V(p+Δ) + Δd(p+Δ). 
For any p and Δ, the intermediary’s welfare loss from a price increase from p to  p+Δ is bounded 
below by Δd(p+Δ), and one has  
V(p) – V(p+Δ)  ≥   Δd(p+Δ). 
 
Similarly, at the input price p+Δ, the intermediary considers the choices q(p+Δ), d(p+Δ), y(p+Δ), 
which he is taking at this price, to be at least as good as the choices q(p), d(p), y(p) that he would 
take if the input price were  p. Therefore,  
V(p+Δ)  ≥  R(q(p)) – pd(p) – y(p), 
and, by the same reasoning as before, one finds that 
V(p) – V(p+Δ)  ≤  Δd(p). 
The difference V(p) – V(p+Δ), i.e., the intermediary’s welfare loss from a price increase from p 
to  p+Δ,  has thus been pinned down somewhere between  Δd(p+Δ) and Δd(p). If we think of Δ 
as being small, so that d(p) and d(p+Δ) are close to each other, the difference between the bounds 
Δd(p+Δ) and Δd(p) is small even in relation to  Δ. In a first approximation then, the welfare loss 
V(p) – V(p+Δ) is approximately equal to the product of the increase Δ in the input price that he 
has to pay with his input demand d(p).  
Now think about the movement from   p
C   to   p
M   as being made up of some number  n  of 




C+2Δ, etc., where Δ = (p
M - p
C)/n , and 
consider the total loss V(p
C) – V(p
M) as the sum of the losses from all these small price in-
creases, i.e. the sum of the differences V(p
C+(k-1)Δ) – V(p
C+kΔ)  as  k  ranges from one to  n. 
For each k, we know that   V(p
C+(k-1)Δ) – V(p
C+kΔ)   lies above  Δd(p




M), as the sum of   V(p
C+(k-1)Δ) – V(p
C+kΔ)   over all  k,  











C+(k-1)Δ) .   29
 
 
Figure 9: Lower and Upper Bounds on the Purchaser’s Welfare Loss 
 
For n = 8, these bounds are illustrated by the two “staircases” in Figure 9. The lower bound is 
represented by the lightly shaded area between the two horizontal lines at prices p
C and p
M, the 
vertical axis, and the “staircase” that lies below the demand curve. The upper bound is repre-
sented by the area between the two horizontal lines at prices p
C and p
M, the vertical axis, and the 
“staircase” that lies above the demand curve; this corresponds to the sum of the lightly and 
darkly shaded areas in the figure. If I had chosen a larger number of “steps”, e.g., n = 16, rather 
than n = 8, each individual step would only be half as large, and the darkly shaded area that 
represents the difference between the two bounds would be smaller. If one lets n go out of 
bounds so that   Δ = (p
M - p
C)/n   go to zero, the steps of the “staircases” become ever more  
numerous and ever smaller. Both bounds for the welfare loss then converge to the area of the 
trapezoid to the left of the demand curve. Because, for all n, the difference V(p
C) – V(p
M) lies 
between these two bounds, one infers that V(p
C) – V(p
M) is in fact equal to the area of the trape-
zoid.
28 
                                        
28   The same reasoning can also be applied in the setting of Section 2, where the good is sold to a consumer. 
Suppose that the consumer’s net payoff from buying an amount   x   of the good at the price   p   is equal to 
the difference   u(x) – px between the utility he gets from consuming   x   and the amount px that he pays for 
it. Thus, if he demands the quantity  d(p)  at the price  p , he gets the payoff  V(p) = u(d(p)) – pd(p). If d(p) 
maximizes u(x) – px over x, one has V(p)  ≥   u(d(p+Δ)) – p d(p+Δ) = V(p+Δ) + Δd(p+Δ), and, similarly, 
V(p+Δ)  ≥  V(p) – Δd(p). The same reasoning as in the text then shows that the difference between V(p) and 
V(p+Δ)  is equal to the shaded area in Figure 1, i.e., the trapezoid between the two horizontal lines at prices  
p
C and p
M, the vertical axis, and the demand curve. 
 